COMMANDERS DIGEST

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President Nixon holds copy of a resolution backing his Vietnam policy which was approved Dec. 2 by the House. The measure then was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. With the President are (left to right), Reps. Kee, D-W.Va.; Edmondson, D-Okla.; Wright, D-Tex.; Adair, R-Ind.; Arends, R-Ill.; Devine, R-Ohio; The President; Sen. Allott, R-Colo.; Rep. Stratton, D-N.Y.; Sen. Thurmond, R-S.C., and Rep. Hays, D-Ohio.

'Silent' America Speaks Out

President Nixon Receives 'Overwhelming' Support of Vietnam Policy

A sensitive nerve in "silent" America was touched by the President of the United States on Nov 3 and the shock waves continued to reverberate throughout the land weeks later.

It was that evening that President Nixon went to the people with his most direct foreign policy statement to date on the war in Vietnam.

By Nov. 25, hundreds of thousands of telegrams and letters from every area and layer of American society had been received at the White House applauding and endorsing the President's position.

Reaction to the President's televised address came so swiftly that by morning there were more than 13,000 telegrams on the President's desk. One telegram contained 26,000 signatures, others were signed by neighborhood groups, and many were signed simply, Mr. and Mrs. . . . The response in favor of the President's speech averaged about 9 to 1 in favor of his remarks and has remained constant.

Although no statistics are maintained by the White House on such events, officials say the steady "in-flow" of mail—if it continues—could possibly make this one of the greatest responses to a Presidential address in history. As one White House staff member put it: "It bowled us over."

General tenor of the in-coming mail is very simple. Gen-

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President Signs Draft Legislation; Secretary Laird Defines New Plan

President Nixon signed draft reform legislation Nov. 26 that "removes the agony of suspense and uncertainty" for young men eligible for induction into the Armed Forces.

In signing the measure, the President recognized that the bill ". . . does not remove all of the inequity of the draft, because there will be inequity as long as any of our young men have to serve when others do not have to serve.

"But," he said, "the agony of suspense and uncertainty which has hung over our younger generation for seven years can now be reduced to one year, and other very needed reforms in the draft can be made by Executive Order."

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird testified on the proposed legislation before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Nov. 14, and explained how, under current regulations, a young man begins his time of maximum vulnerability to the draft at

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Secretary Rogers Outlines U. S. Approach

Strategic Arms Talks

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are maintaining complete silence on matters being discussed by the two governments at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which are now taking place in Helsinki, Finland.

Shortly before the long-awaited talks began on Nov. 17, however, Secretary of State William P. Rogers delivered what was described as a definitive statement of the principles agreed upon by the Administration. "While I will not be able to discuss specific proposals," Mr. Rogers said, "I thought it might be helpful to outline the general approach of our government in these talks."

Below are excerpts from his speech of Nov. 13.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers

Next Monday in Helsinki the United States and the Soviet Union will open preliminary talks leading to what could be the most critical negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken. The two most powerful nations on earth will be seeking a way to curb what to date has been an unending competition in the strategic arms race.

The Government of the United States will enter these negotiations with serious purpose and with the hope that we can achieve balanced understandings that will benefit the cause of world peace and security. Yet we begin these negotiations knowing that they are likely to be long and complicated and with the full realization that they may not succeed.

The Present Situation

The present situation—in which both the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the other regardless of which struck first—radically weakens the rationale for continuing the arms race.

Competitive accumulation of more sophisticated weapons would not add to the basic security of either side. Militarily it probably would produce little or no net advantage. Economically it would divert resources needed elsewhere. Politically it would perpetuate the tensions and fears that are the social fallout of the nuclear arms race.

So a capacity for mutual destruction leads to a mutual interest in putting a stop to the strategic nuclear arms race.

Nonetheless technology advances remorselessly. It offers new opportunities to both sides to add to their offensive and defensive strategic systems. Both sides find it difficult to reject these opportunities in an atmosphere of rivalry and in the absence of a verifiable agreement. It raises temptations to seek strategic advantages. Yet now such advantages cannot be hidden for long, and both sides will certainly take whatever countermeasures are necessary to preserve their retaliatory capability.

This is the situation in which the two sides now find themselves. Where national security interests may have operated in the past to stimulate the strategic arms race, those same national security interests may now operate to stop or slow down the race. The question to be faced in the strategic arms talks is whether societies with the advanced intellect to develop these awesome weapons of mass destructions have the combined wisdom to control and curtail them.

Basis For Hope

Given the complexity of the strategic situation, the vital national interests involved, and the traditional impulses to seek protection in military strength it is easy to be cynical about the prospects for the talks into which we are about to enter. Nonetheless some basis for hope exists.

First is the fact that the talks are being held at all. The diplomatic exchanges leading up to these talks were responsible in nature. And the talks themselves will require discussion of military matters by both sides in which the veil of secrecy

will have to be, if not lifted, at least refashioned. These factors lead us to the hope that the talks are being entered into seriously.

Second is the matter of timing. Previous disparity in nuclear strength has been succeeded by the situation of sufficiency of which I have already spoken. And because this condition will continue for the foreseeable future the time then seems to be propitious for considering how to curb the race in which neither side in all likelihood can gain meaningful advantage.

Third is a mutuality of interest. Under present circumstances an equitable limitation on strategic nuclear weapons would strengthen the national security of both sides. If this is mutually perceived—if both sides conduct these talks in the light of that perception—the talks may accomplish an historic breakthrough in the pattern of confrontation that has characterized the postwar world.

May I pause to point out again that I do not wish to predict that the talks will be easy or that progress is imminent or for that matter likely. Mutuality of interest for states accustomed to rivalry is difficult to perceive. Traditions are powerful. Temptations to seek advantage run strong. Developments in other areas are bound to have an impact on these discussions.

Protecting Vital Interests

Both parties will approach the talks with great caution and pursue them with immaculate care. The U.S. and the USSR are entirely capable of protecting their vital interests and can be counted upon to do so. So there is little chance that either side would accept an outcome that leads to its net national disadvantage. In our case also we would not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our allies, who will continue to be consulted as the talks develop.

On the other hand we must also recognize that a prime technique of international politics—as of other politics—is talk. If these talks are serious they can lead to better understanding on both sides of the rationale behind strategic weapons decisions. This in itself might provide a climate in which to avoid compulsive decisions.

Talks need not necessarily call for an explicit agreement at any particular stage. Whether we can slow down, stop or eventually throw the arms race into reverse, remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether this be by a formal treaty or treaties, by a series of agreements, by parallel action, or by a convergence of viewpoints resulting from a better understanding of respective positions.

What counts at this point is that a dialogue is beginning about the management of the strategic relations of the two superpowers on a better, safer, cheaper basis than uncontrolled acquisition of still more weapons.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. approaches the talks as an opportunity to rest our security on what I would call a balanced strategy. In pursuit of this balanced strategy of security we will enter the Helsinki talks with three objectives:

- To enhance international security by maintaining a stable US-Soviet strategic relationship through limitations on the deployment of strategic armaments.
- To halt the upward spiral of strategic arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.
- To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation.

Some say that there will be risks in such a process. But it is easy to focus too much on the risks that would accompany such a new environment and too little on the risks of the one in which we now live. Certainly, such risks are minimal compared to the benefits for mankind which would flow from success.

I am confident that this country will not let down its guard, lose its alertness, or fail to maintain adequate programs to protect against a collapse or evasion of any strategic arms agreement. No delegation to any disarmament negotiation has ever been better prepared or better qualified than the U.S. delegation. The risks in seeking an agreement seem to be manageable, insurable, and reasonable ones to run. They seem less dangerous than the risks of open-ended arms competition—risks about which we perhaps have become somewhat callous.

What Is At Stake

I have mentioned the rewards of progress in terms of international security, world order, and improved opportunities for replacing a stalemated confrontation with a process of negotiations.

But there are also other stakes in these talks that come closer to home. On both sides of this strategic race there are urgent needs for resources to meet pressing domestic needs. Strategic weapons cannot solve the problems of how we live at home, or how we live in the world in this last third of the 20th Century. The USSR, which devotes a much larger proportion of its national resources to armaments than we do, must see this as well.

Who knows the rewards if we succeed in diverting the energy, the time and attention—the manpower and brainpower—devoted to ever more sophisticated weapons to other and more worthwhile purposes?

Speaking before the U.N. General Assembly two months ago, President Nixon said that he hoped the strategic arms talks would begin soon because "there is no more important task before us." And he added that we must "make a determined effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic arms, but to reverse it."

Just last week President Podgorny of the Soviet Union said: "A positive outcome of the talks would undoubtedly help improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen the peace." To that I say "Amen."

He added that: "The Soviet Union is striving to achieve precisely such results." Well, so are we; and in this we have the support of the military Services, of the Congress, and of the American people.

To that end this Government approaches the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in sober and serious determination to do our full part to bring a halt to this unproductive and costly competition in strategic nuclear armaments.

White House Explains New Draft Selection System

MAJOR CHANGES

The new program accomplishes the following major improvements in draft selection procedures:

1. It reduces the period of prime draft vulnerability, and the uncertainty that accompanies it, from up to 7 years, under the previous system, to only 1 year.

2. It establishes this vulnerability for a fixed time in each young man's life, which will be much less disruptive to him in terms of his personal planning.

3. It establishes a fair and easily understandable method of random selection among such young men, if they are found by their local boards to be available and qualified for service.

4. It undertakes to establish as soon as possible procedures under which a Selective Service registrant may request an Armed Forces examination so that he can know if he is physically and mentally qualified for military service.

These changes are presented in greater detail below.

1. Limited Vulnerability

Under the previous draft procedure a young man began his time of maximum vulnerability to the draft at age 19 and, if he did not volunteer for service, remained in that status until he was drafted or reached his 26th birthday. Selection among men in this age group who were found "available and qualified" for service by their draft boards was on an oldest-first basis. Under recent conditions of relatively high draft calls the age of involuntary induction has been low, averaging about 20½ years. However, when draft calls were much smaller, as they had been during the early 1960's, the average draft age had reached nearly 24 years. This had created a long period of uncertainty for young men and had handicapped many of them in attempting to get jobs or training, and made it difficult for them to plan their lives intelligently.

Under the revised system a "First Priority Selection Group" is established which will normally constitute the only group from which men will be called involuntarily into service, other than those delinquent in their obligations under the law, or medical, dental, and allied specialists (who are subject to special calls after they complete their professional training.) Those registrants who are not selected for induction during their 12-month period of exposure will then be placed into a lower priority category and will normally not be vulnerable for induction except under the unlikely circumstances that the First Priority Group is completely exhausted. Thus, under normal conditions a young man will receive an earlier and more decisive answer to his question, "Where do I stand with the draft?" and will be able to plan his life accordingly.

2. The New Order of Call

Under the new system, as under the previous procedure, the first priorities for induction in any draft board will consist of registrants who are delinquent in their responsibilities under the law and of those volunteering for induction. The principal, or "First Priority Selection Group" for involuntary induction will, however, be limited after 1970 (the initial transitional year) to draft eligible men in their 19th year of age at the beginning of the year and to those men between the ages of 19 and 26 whose deferments expired during the year upon completion of school or for other reasons. The new procedure thus establishes a "youngest first" rather than "oldest first" priority for induction. This will result in a stable and predictable draft age period for each young man—either in the year following his attainment of age 19 or in the year after he leaves school or otherwise ceases to be deferred.

However, in 1970, beginning with the draft call to be filled in January 1970, this First Priority Group will also include all draft eligible men who are in the ages 20 through 25 at the beginning of the year, so that no individual eligible for induction under the previous rules will escape vulnerability simply because of the change to the new system.

3. Random Selection

Since more men are classified as available for service each year than are required to fill current or expected draft calls, a fair and understandable procedure is needed to determine whom to call first, whom to call second, and whom not to call at all. Under the authority of the recent amendment to the draft law (P.L. 91–124, November 26, 1969) President Nixon has authorized the Director of Selective Service to place into effect a simple random selection procedure for this purpose, based upon a random sequence of the 365 or 366 days of each year. An initial drawing to be held on December 1, 1969 will establish this random listing of birth dates for individuals who will be in ages 19 through 25 years on December 31, 1969. This sequence will apply nationally to the order of induction to be followed by each local draft board this coming year. Thus, if June 21 is the first day drawn then those in the first priority group, available for induction, whose birthdays are June 21, will be the first to be ordered for induction involuntarily in January 1970 following delinquents and volunteers. If January 12 is the next date drawn, individuals with that birthday would be second in order of call in their respective draft boards.

In the event that two or more men have the same birth date within a local board their sequence of induction will be determined by the first letter of their names (last name and, if necessary, first name) which will be arranged in a random sequence to be established by a supplemental drawing also to be conducted on December 1. Draft eligibles in the "first priority" age group whose numbers have not been reached at the end of the year, will be placed in a lower order of call next year and will be vulnerable for induction only if the First Priority Group of next year is exhausted.

4. Voluntary Armed Forces Examination

The President has directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Selective Service to establish procedures under which registrants of the Selective Service System may request of their Local Board an armed forces qualifying examination

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DoD Voices Concern Of Shrinking Airspace

The Department of Defense is concerned about the growth of civil aviation and the shrinking airspace available for military flight operations, Phillip N. Whittaker told members of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics.

Mr. Whittaker, assistant secretary of the Air Force for installations and logistics and chairman of the Defense Department's advisory committee on federal aviation, said DoD's concern falls into these categories:

—Air safety and a reduction in the mid-air collision potential.

—Adequate airspace to accomplish the military mission.

—Judicious application of joint use of military airfields.

"Our greatest concern with respect to this rapid increase in aviation activities must necessarily be the impact on air safety," he said.

According to the FAA's "Near Mid-Air Collision Study" of 1968, Mr. Whittaker noted, those reported mid-air collisions where military aircraft were involved occured primarily in the vicinity of larger civilian terminals.

Furthermore, he said, the study found that missions such as undergraduate pilot training in the vicinity of heavy general aviation activity "were affected to a particularly great degree."

Mr. Whittaker continued:

"In the interest of safety, the Military Departments have been attempting to integrate their flying activities into the National Airspace System. We have had some success, but it is evident the system has been unable to keep pace in recent years with the growing volume of IFR traffic."

The 'see and be seen' mode of separation is becoming archaic in many areas of the United States, Mr. Whittaker said, particularly in highly urbanized areas.

The Department of Defense operates 242 airfields in the continental United States. "Many communities are looking with envy at nearby military installations," Mr. Whittaker said.

He added:

"While there is no doubt that civil use of military bases is often the quickest and most economical method of satisfying civil requirements, continuing necessary military operations at these military airfields present a practical limit on the amount of civil aviation which can be accommodated. . . .

"In general, joint use of an air base supporting tactical missions is particularly difficult to authorize due to unique requirements involving special security, weapons handling and alerts. There are, however, many situations where joint use of military bases is acceptable, where such joint use has community support which clearly recognizes the necessary priority of the military mission, and where acquisition of land and construction of additional facilities result in a mutually acceptable installation configuration."

Mr. Whittaker said the Air Force is currently reviewing the impact of civil aviation on 94 active Air Force bases in the continental United States. Separate studies are also being conducted at all DoD installations in Southern California and in the Northeast United States.

White House Explains New Draft Selection System

(Continued from Preceding Page)

at the earliest feasible time. Local Boards will schedule such examination to be held at an Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station.

Random selection and this new opportunity of a registrant to have a qualifying examination will reduce uncertainty and make it more possible for young men to plan their lives.

The Draft Outlook for 1970

Young men who will be vulnerable for induction next year will want to know: Once the birthdate drawing has taken place, and a random sequence has been set, what are my chances of being drafted next year?

The actual chances of being reached for induction for draft-eligible men with a given position on the birthdate list will depend upon many factors, particularly upon future military strength requirements as we progress in our efforts to Vietnamize the war and upon the rate of voluntary enlistments and re-enlistments. Any possible changes in draft deferment policies or procedures, resulting from the current reviews within the Administration or from Congressional reviews scheduled for next year could also affect this outlook.

The Department of Defense has, however, prepared certain estimates based upon the best available information at this time. These estimates show the projected military manpower requirements from the pool of men, age 19–25 years, who will be available for induction during 1970. This pool is estimated at 850,000, including about 500,000 19–25 year olds who would be immediately available at the beginning of the year, if fully examined and processed, and an additional 350,000 who will become available during 1970 when their deferments expire. The DOD has further estimated that a total of 550,000, or 64% of this group, will be required for military service either as volunteers or inductees. This is based on the currently planned military end strength of about 3.2 million in June 1970 and on an assumption that this strength level will be maintained during the period July-December 1970. Based on past experience it is expected that 290,000 of the total number required from this group will volunteer for either active or reserve service. The remaining requirement or about 250,000 would, therefore, have to be met through induction. This represents approximately 45% of the residual manpower pool in 1970, excluding those who will have volunteered for service.

In view of the many uncertainties involved in these estimates, our best judgment at this time is that registrants whose birth dates will appear in the top one-third of the random birth date sequence will have a high probability of being drafted; those in the bottom one-third, a relatively low probability of being reached for induction.

President Signs Draft Legislation; System Defined

(Continued from Page 1)

19, and if he does not volunteer for service, remains in that status until he is drafted or reaches his 26th birthday.

He pointed out how those not called up earlier could remain in this condition of high vulnerability for a period of as long as seven years and said ". . . there is now a broad national consensus that this period of vulnerability must be shortened in the interest of fairness to our young men."

Following are Secretary Laird's remarks on how the new draft reform system will be set up:

"In order to initiate this reform, two steps are necessary. The first is to designate a 'prime age group'—that is, the age group which will be placed first in the basic priority order for induction. Under the President's plan, this group will consist, each year, of registrants who, at the beginning of a 12-month period, are in their 20th year of age, that is, who have passed their 19th birthday and have not reached their 20th birthday.

"Registrants who are temporarily deferred at this age, typically because of school enrollment, would be placed in this prime age group, and considered 'constructive' 19-year-olds, in the year after their deferment expired. During the first year that this plan is placed into effect, the prime group will include 'all' qualified and available men, from nineteen to twenty-six, so that no men will escape vulnerability during this transitional period." (The word 'all' means those classified in 1-A and are not in a deferment classification.)

Secretary Laird said that after careful study within the Executive Branch, "it is our conclusion that the fairest way of selecting men under these conditions is by a fully random system—one which will assure that among all young men in a prime age group, who have been found qualified and available for service—each man has an equal chance of being selected first, selected second or not selected at all. This conclusion," he said, "was reached after the most careful review of the options available to the President under existing law."

The amended law (P.L. 91–124) restores to the President the authority to place such a system into effect. It simply removes a constraint, imposed under the 1967 law, requiring adherence to the "oldest first" rule within any age class.

Roger T. Kelley, assistant secretary of defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee how the new system will work.

"Prior to each calendar year, all dates of that year (365 or 366) would be randomly drawn." (The drawing was held Dec. 1 at Selective Service Headquarters in Washington D.C.)

"This drawing would establish for use by each local board the sequence for inducting members of the prime age group.

"At the beginning of the year, the young man has simply to examine where his birthdate falls in the list of 365 or 366 dates, and he knows his relative vulnerability to the draft during his prime year.

"Once his place in the sequence is determined, his assignment in terms of draft order would never change. If he were granted a deferment or exemption at age 19 or 20, he would reenter the prime age group when his deferment or exemption expired, and would take the same place in the sequence that he was originally assigned."

Mr. Kelly pointed out one thing the random selection system will not do. "It will not substitute chance for reason," he said, adding: "Draft boards would continue to be responsible for authorizing deferments on the basis of such reasons as hardship or college study. Random selection only establishes an order of inducting those who are classified 1-A—that is, those who are qualified and available after deferment periods (if any) have expired.

"This would take the place of the mandatory oldest-first procedure now used by draft boards in selecting qualified 1-A's for induction."

President Nixon signs into law the new random selection system. Witnessing the ceremony are (l to r) John R. Blandford, chief council, House Armed Services Committee; Frank Slatinshek, assistant council, House Armed Services Committee; Roger T. Kelley, assistant secretary of defense (M&RA); Rep. Edward F. Hebert, House Armed Services Committee; Rep. Clark MacGregor, House Judiciary Committee; Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman, House Armed Services Committee; Rep. Leslie C. Arends, House Armed Services Committee, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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